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ADDRESS-SUMMARY PREJUDGMENT
CREDITORS' REMEDIES AND DUE PROCESS OF
LAW: CONTINUING UNCERTAINTY AFTER
MITCHELL v. W. T GRANT COMPANY*
Roy L. STEINHEIMER, JR.**
I have long felt that the Supreme Court and commercial law make
strange bedfellows and the Court's recent decisions in the area of
summary prejudgment remedies of creditors tend to reinforce this
feeling. The Supreme Court's tinkering with these creditors' remedies
started in the late sixties with its decision in Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp.' The facts in that case are simple enough. Christine
Sniadach was an employee of Miller Harris Instrument Company in
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, who borrowed money from Family Finance
Corporation and failed to pay off the loan when it was due. In strict
accordance with the Wisconsin garnishment statute,' Family Finance
commenced a garnishment action against Mrs. Sniadach and her
employer, Miller Harris, as garnishee.
Summonses were issued in the garnishment action by the clerk of
the court. The summons served on Miller Harris had the effect of
freezing Mrs. Sniadach's wages. Subsequently, but on the same day,
Mrs. Sniadach was also served with a summons in the garnishment
action. She then moved to dismiss the garnishment action, claiming
that the Wisconsin garnishment statute was unconstitutional since it
established a technique for taking her property without the proce-
dural due process required by the fourteenth amendment.3 Mrs. Snia-
dach contended that she was entitled to prior notice and hearing
before her wages could be frozen by a summons served on Miller
Harris. It is interesting to observe that she did not deny borrowing
the money from Family Finance, nor did she deny being in default
on the loan. She did not claim that any valid defenses could be
asserted against Family Finance. It is therefore difficult to imagine
in these circumstances what real benefit Mrs. Sniadach would have
enjoyed from notice and hearing before the inevitable garnishment
occurred. The Supreme Court nonetheless held that she had been
*Given before the West Virginia Bar Association, August 31, 1974.
**Dean, School of Law, Washington & Lee University. A.B. (1937), University of
Kansas; J.D. (1940), University of Michigan. Member of the Bars of Michigan, New
York and Virginia.
1 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
2 Wis. STAT. §§ 267.01 et seq. (1965).
3 395 U.S. at 338-39.
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denied due process under the fourteenth amendment and that the
Wisconsin garnishment statute was unconstitutional.4
Frankly, I had some difficulty with the Sniadach decision. This
difficulty did not stem from any desire to defend the merits of pre-
judgment garnishment as a creditor's remedy but from the decision's
implications in relation to the fourteenth amendment. Indeed, I must
confess to a certain sympathy for the position taken by Mr. Justice
Black in his stinging dissent in Sniadach.5 If the garnishment remedy
was to be hedged in by restrictions on its use, was it not a matter more
appropriately accomplished by legislation rather than through the
Id. at 342.
The Wisconsin law is said to violate the "fundamental principles of
due process." Of course the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment contains no words that indicate that this Court has
power to play so fast and loose with state laws. The arguments the
Court makes to reach what I consider to be its unconstitutional
conclusion, however, show why it strikes down this state law. It is
because it considers a garnishment law of this kind to be bad state
policy, a judgment I think the state legislature, not this Court, has
power to make. The Court shows it believes the garnishment policy
to be a "most inhuman doctrine;" that it "compels the wage earner,
trying to keep his family together, to be driven below the poverty
level;" that "in a vast number of cases the debt is a fraudulent one,
saddled on a poor ignorant person who is trapped in an easy credit
nightmare, in which he is charged double for something he could not
pay for even if the proper price was called for, and then hounded into
giving up his pound of flesh, and being fired besides."
The foregoing emotional rhetoric might be very appropriate for
Congressmen to make against some phases of garnishment laws. In-
deed, the quoted statements were made by Congressmen during a
debate over a proposed federal garnishment law. The arguments
would also be appropriate for Wisconsin's legislators to make against
that State's garnishment laws. But made in a Court opinion, holding
Wisconsin's law unconstitutional, they amount to what I believe to be
a plain, judicial usurpation of state legislative power to decide what
the State's laws should be. There is not one word in our Federal
Constitution or in any of its Amendments and not a word in the
reports of that document's passage from which one can draw the
slightest inference that we have authority thus to try to supplement
or strike down the State's selection of its own policies. The Wisconsin
law is simply nullified by this Court as though the Court had been
granted a super-legislative power to step in and frustrate policies of
States adopted by their own elected legislatures. The Court thus steps
back into the due process philosophy which brought on President
Roosevelt's Court fight. Arguments can be made for outlawing loan
sharks and installment sales companies but such decisions, I think,
should be made by state and federal legislators, and not by this Court.
Id. at 344-45.
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medium of the fourteenth amendment? I believe so. Yet Sniadach in
the limited context of prejudgment garnishment of wages might well
have been acceptable even to the commercial community. Unfortun-
ately, it has not been limited to prejudgment garnishment. The deci-
sion came quickly to be viewed as an open invitation to attack in the
name of due process a number of respectable creditors' remedies.
This invitation in Sniadach did not go unheeded. Like mushrooms
after a warm spring rain, dozens of actions sprouted over the nation
challenging prejudgment seizures of property by creditors without
prior notice and hearing. Based on Sniadach, debtors suddenly per-
ceived that they had been deprived of due process by the exercise of.
landlords' liens,6 bankers' liens, 7 garagemen's liens,8 attachments,9
seizures of real property through writs of immediate possession,'0 ex-
ercise of the power of sale in mortgages on real property," and by
summary repossession of collateral in secured transactions.1 2 And the
fertile fields opened by Sniadach have not yet yielded their full har-
vest to debtors who are now hypersensitive to due process. Consider
the potential for attack under Sniadach on the vendor's lien on real
property, the warehousemen's lien, the carrier's lien, laundrymen's
liens, jewelers' liens, veterinarians' liens, miners' liens, loggers' liens,
and agisters' liens to name just a few. How is the pledgee of collateral
affected when he wishes to realize on the collateral? 3 How is the
security interest of banks in collection items affected? 4 Even some
of the remedies of buyers and sellers under Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code may well be called into question."5
The reaction of the courts to the extensive litigation provoked by
Sniadach has been mixed. Some judges, under the Sniadach banner,
have cut down various creditors' summary prejudgment remedies in
6 Shaffer v. Holbrook, 346 F.Supp. 762 (S.D.W.Va. 1972) (relying on both
Sniadach and Fuentes).
Bichel Optical Laboratories, Inc. v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 336 F. Supp. 1368
(D. Minn. 1971), aff'd, 487 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1973).
9 Mason v. Garris, 360 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Ga.) (relying on both Sniadach and
Fuentes), modified, 364 F. Supp. 452 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
1 Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing & Fin. Corp., 326 F. Supp. 1335 (E.D. Pa. 1971),
aff'd, 456 F.2d 979 (3d Cir), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 843 (1972).
11 Mihans v. Municipal Court, 7 Cal. App. 3d 479, - P2d _ 87 Cal. Rptr.
17 (1970).
" Young v. Ridley, 309 F. Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1970).
,2 Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-305.
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-208.
" See, e.g., UCC §§ 2-502, 2-507(2), 2-702(2), 2-711(3), and 2-716(3). See also UCC
§ 9-113.
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the name of due process. Other judges, understandably concerned
with the ramifications of Sniadach, have restricted its impact rather
severely. Out of this litigation, Fuentes v. Shevin5 arrived in the
Supreme Court for decision in 1972. By this time there had been some
changes in the make-up of the Court. Chief Justice Warren and Jus-
tices Black, Fortas and Harlan were no longer on the Court. Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist had
succeeded them. However, Justices Powell and Rehnquist did not
participate in the Fuentes case. Thus Fuentes was heard and decided
by only seven justices.
The decisions of two three-judge federal district courts were con-
solidated for hearing in Fuentes v. Shevin.'7 1 will refer in detail only
to the situation involving Margarita Fuentes since it is sufficiently
illustrative of the basic problem faced by the Court. Mrs. Fuentes, a
resident of Dade County, Florida, purchased a gas stove and a stereo
set from Firestone Tire and Rubber Company on an installment plan.
She signed a security agreement which granted a security interest to
Firestone and gave Firestone the right to repossess the merchandise
if she defaulted in her installment payments. After Mrs. Fuentes
admittedly had fallen some $200 behind in her payments, Firestone,
pursuant to the Florida replevin statutes,18 filed a complaint and
supporting affidavit in an action of replevin in the Small Claims
Court of Dade County and posted a replevin bond. Upon the filing of
these papers, the clerk of the Small Claims Court issued a writ of
replevin which was served on Mrs. Fuentes along with the complaint
and affidavit at the time the deputy sheriff took possession of the
stove and stereo set. Under the Florida replevin statute, she could
have recovered possession of the goods by filing a counterbond. In-
stead, relying on Sniadach, she brought suit against Firestone for an
injunction against enforcement of the Florida replevin statute alleg-
,6 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
'7 In the other decision, Epps v. Cortese, three individuals challenged the constitu-
tionality of Pennsylvania's prejudgment replevin process. They had purchased per-
sonal property under installment sales contracts. The sellers obtained and executed
summary writs of replevin claiming that the buyers had fallen behind in their pay-
ments. Id. at 71. Execution was in strict accordance with state law. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 1821 (1967) and PA. R. Civ. P. 1073, 1076, and 1077.
The Court quite properly characterized the situation of a fourth appellant in Epps
as "bizarre." 407 U.S. at 72. She had been divorced from a deputy sheriff and was
engaged in a child custody dispute with him. Being familiar with the replevin process,
he obtained a writ ordering the seizure of the child's clothes, furniture and toys. Id.
Unlike Mrs. Fuentes, none of the appellants in Epps was ever sued by the party
who initiated seizure of the property involved. Id. n.4.
1 FLA. STAT. §§ 78.01, 78.07, 78.08, 78.10, 78.13 (Supp. 1972).
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ing that the statute was unconstitutional under the fourteenth
amendment since it permitted seizure of her property without prior
notice and hearing.
By a vote of four to three, the Supreme Court held that the
Sniadach doctrine was applicable to a secured party who had repos-
sessed collateral by replevin procedures without prior notice and
hearing and declared the Florida statute unconstitutional under the
fourteenth amendment. 9 Mr. Justice White, who had been with the
majority in Sniadach, wrote the dissenting opinion in Fuentes and
was joined by Mr. Chief Justice Burger and Mr. Justice Blackmun,
the only justices who had not participated in Sniadach.
As I view it, there are sufficient differences between Sniadach and
Fuentes to call for different results in the two cases. The commercial
community can adjust to Sniadach if the impact of that case is re-
stricted to remedies such as garnishment. However, it is unreasonable
to expect the commercial community to live with Fuentes. In his
Fuentes opinion, Mr. Justice Stewart stated that there might be "ex-
traordinary situations" which could justify summary repossession
without notice. To my mind it should be the other way around; i.e.,
summary repossession should be permitted without notice except in
"extraordinary situations."
There are significant distinctions between the situation in
Sniadach and that in Fuentes. In Sniadach, Family Finance was an
unsecured creditor with all that status suggests in terms of high credit
risks and high interest rates to compensate for those risks. As an
unsecured creditor, Family Finance had no claim to any specific
property of Mrs. Sniadach's prior to the garnishment. Only when she
defaulted and Family Finance was faced with the stark reality of the
risks it well knew were inherent in the unsecured loan transaction did
it suddenly seize her wages. This seizure of Mrs. Sniadach's property
was little more than a "boot-strap" operation by which Family Fi-
nance hoped to obtain a preferred position in relation to her other
unsecured creditors. It smacks of "race of diligence" tactics by which
unsecured creditors rush in to protect themselves through summary
prejudgment seizures of a debtor's property while the poor debtor
usually takes the hindermost in the process. Fuentes presented to the
Court the opportunity to limit Sniadach to this kind of unsecured
creditor situation.
In Fuentes, on the other hand, Firestone was a secured creditor
rather than an unsecured creditor. Firestone had insisted on collat-
eral to secure payment of Mrs. Fuentes' indebtedness. This secured
11 407 U.S. at 96-97.
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credit arrangement must have influenced Firestone in its appraisal
of the credit risks, its willingness to extend credit, and the charges it
would make for the extension of credit. In appraising the transaction,
Firestone undoubtedly assumed that if Mrs. Fuentes defaulted, it
would be able to use time honored repossession procedures without
the additional expense, delay and risks which would be involved by
compliance with the requirements of procedural due process.
This distinction between the unsecured creditor in Sniadach and
the secured creditor in Fuentes is significant. As a matter of policy,
our state legislatures and courts have traditionally provided less pro-
tection to unsecured creditors than to secured creditors. The socio-
economic reasons for this policy hardly need detailed exposition. This
difference in treatment of unsecured and secured creditors is reflected
in the Uniform Commercial Code."0 Even among secured creditors we
find differences in treatment. Our legislatures and courts have tradi-
tionally accorded the highest order of protection to purchase money
secured creditors whose massive infusions of credit are so essential to
our economy. 21 The traditional state policies of according different
treatment to different kinds of creditors should not be ignored when
questions of due process are raised. Even if one accepts the proposi-
tion that due process protection is ordinarily needed when unsecured
creditors exercise summary prejudgment remedies, it does not follow
that the same is true of secured creditors. The balance of interests is
substantially different in the two situations. When secured creditors
are involved-and particularly purchase money secured creditors-it
seems appropriate that the fourteenth amendment should be invoked
only in "extraordinary situations" where the secured creditor has
demonstrably departed from accepted norms in the exercise of the
remedy of summary repossession. In Fuentes, Firestone was not only
a secured creditor, it was a purchase money secured creditor. Yet the
Court put Firestone on the same footing under the fourteenth amend-
ment as the lowly unsecured creditor.
Consider another difference between Sniadach and Fuentes. The
unsecured creditor in Sniadach had no prior interest in or claim to
the property which he suddenly seized. The secured creditor in
Fuentes had contractual rights in relation to the collateral from the
very inception of the secured transaction. The security agreement
between the secured creditor and the debtor carefully arranged their
contractual interests in the collateral for the duration of the secured
transaction. The manner in which each of the parties to this agree-
2 See, e.g., UCC §§ 2-402, 9-301.
" See, e.g., UCC §§ 9-301(2), 9-301(1)(d), 9-312(3)(4).
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ment could exercise these contractual rights in the collateral was
spelled out in the agreement. The debtor was permitted to have full
use and enjoyment of the collateral as long as she paid the install-
ments when they fell due. Upon default, which had occurred in
Fuentes, the secured party was given the contractual right to posses-
sion of the property. The repossession of the collateral was simply an
adjustment of contractual rights between the parties in much the
same way that breach of a contract results in forfeit of a deposit given
to assure performance of an agreement. Is such an adjustment of
interests pursuant to contractual arrangement the basis for invoking
the fourteenth amendment?
We should not lose sight of the fact that the contractual arrange-
ment of interests in collateral is authorized by our legislatures in
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The complex provisions
of that Article have been painstakingly developed over a period of a
quarter of a century to establish the proper balance between the
interests of the secured creditor and the debtor. Provision is made for
the method of creation of a secured creditor's rights in the collateral,"2
for the exercise of those rights by repossession,2 for the right of re-
demption by the debtor after repossession, 4 and for remedies to the
debtor if the repossession is improper.2
In addition, there has been widespread adoption of consumer pro-
tection legislation which bears importantly on the interests of the
secured creditor and debtor. This legislation, like the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, involves a delicate and complex adjustment of the
interests of the parties. The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, for
example, has been through a number of drafts over the past fifteen
years or so in an effort to establish a proper balance among the com-
peting interests in consumer transactions. One of the important inter-
ests which this legislation has carefully preserved is the secured credi-
tor's right to summary repossession of collateral." Whether a proper
balance was struck between the competing interests of the secured
creditor and the debtor by preserving this right is not a matter for
the Supreme Court to decide. It is a decision which should be left to
2 UCC § 9-203.
2 UCC § 9-503.
24 UCC § 9-506.
25 UCC § 9-507.
21 See generally UNIFoRM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.103. Note however that if the
property subject to the security interest sold for $1,000 or less, the buyer is not liable
to the seller for any deficiency. Note also that the National Consumer Act forbids a
secured party to take 'possession of property subject to a security interest without
judicial process. Compare UCCC § 5.103 with NAT'L CONS. AcT §§ 5.024, 5.206.
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the state legislatures due to their superior fact-finding abilities. The
Supreme Court should disturb this right in the name of due process
only where prior notice and hearing are clearly necessary to provide
meaningful protection to the debtor. This will normally be an "ex-
traordinary situation." I venture to say that in most repossession
situations the default is unquestioned and the right to repossess is
evident. In such circumstances, notice and hearing can be little more
than a noisome and fruitless ritual. Only the "extraordinary situa-
tion" justifies the protection of due process. Fuentes unfortunately
turns the emphasis around and disrupts the legislative structure for
secured transactions by imposing requirements of notice and hearing
in all summary repossession situations except the "extraordinary sit-
uation."
Multiple interests in property are not peculiar to secured transac-
tions. Such multiple interests are found in a wide variety of situa-
tions; bailments and leases are obvious examples. Over the years,
parties to such arrangements have commonly adjusted their interests
without resort to the courts. This sort of extrajudicial adjustment of
such interests between private parties is both expeditious and sensi-
ble. It is economically sound and is socially acceptable. To illustrate,
take the simple gratuitous bailment which involves multiple interests
in property. From childhood, we encounter the gratuitous bailment
and in coping with it we follow behavioral patterns which come quite
naturally. A child who is the proud owner of a new tricycle may
magnanimously permit a friend to use the tricycle for an unspecified
period of time. However, when the youthful bailor decides that the
time for sharing the velocipede has expired, you may be sure that an
extrajudicial adjustment of interests in the velocipede will occur.
Only in the "extraordinary situation," where some violence may be
involved in the process of adjustment, do fond parents intercede. We
grow to adulthood repeating this accepted pattern of behavior as we
lend our property to others in an endless series of gratuitous bailment
arrangements. You borrow my ladder and fail to return it. I need the
ladder and go to your garage and repossess it without notice to you. I
borrow your sailboat and fail to return it to your mooring. Without
prior notice to me, you board the boat and sail her back to your
mooring. Have practical adjustments between private citizens of
multiple interests in property escaped involvement with the four-
teenth amendment only because there seems to be no state action
involved or because such a process makes common sense, economic
sense, and is socially acceptable? If the reason be the latter, as I
suspect it is, why should the process suddenly become invalid under
the fourteenth amendment if one uses a writ of replevin to accomplish
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the same result. Should the replevin procedure not be equally as
acceptable as self-help except in a truly "extraordinary situation?"
I submit that the differences between Sniadach and Fuentes were
significant enough to tip the scales in favor of the constitutionality
of the Florida replevin statute when one weighs the competing inter-
ests involved. Commercial reality certainly called for such a result.
Even if one accepts the argument that in the case of unsecured credi-
tors the debtor's need for protection from summary prejudgment sei-
zures of his property outweighs the interests of the state and its
citizens to provide appropriate remedies to such creditors, it does not
follow that the same is true where secured creditors are involved. The
interests of a debtor and a secured party in a secured transaction
situation are equally deserving of protection. The state has tradition-
ally controlled the activities of its citizens with regard to contract
arrangements involving collateral security and it has an abiding in-
terest in being able to control the delicate balance between the inter-
ests of a debtor and a secured party which are created under its laws.
This state interest includes control and supervision not only of the
manner in which its citizens can arrange their interests in secured
transactions but also of the methods by which they can adjust their
interests in such transactions, whether by summary repossession of
collateral or otherwise. In Fuentes the Supreme Court had the oppor-
tunity to put summary prejudgment remedies of creditors in a com-
mercially viable posture. Pursuant to Sniadach, summary remedies
of unsecured creditors, such as garnishment, could have been left
under the cloud of procedural due process except in "extraordinary
situations." On the other hand, summary repossession of collateral
by a secured creditor could have been placed beyond the pale of the
fourteenth amendment except in "extraordinary situations."
My feelings about Fuentes are reflected in Mr. Justice White's
dissenting opinion in that case:
• . . The Court's rhetoric is seductive, but in end analysis,
the result it reaches will have little impact and represents no
more than ideological tinkering with state law. . . . It is very
doubtful in my mind that such a hearing would in fact result
in protections for the debtor substantially different from those
the present laws provide. On the contrary, the availability of
credit may sell be diminished or, in any event, the expense of
securing it increased.
• . . The procedure that the Court strikes down is not some
barbaric hangover from bygone days. The respective rights of
the parties in secured transactions have undergone the most
1975]
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intensive analysis in recent years .... I am content to rest on
the judgement of those who have wrestled with these problems
so long and often and upon the judgement of the legislatures
that have considered and so recently adopted provisions that
contemplate precisely what has happened in these cases."7
Unfavorable reaction to the Fuentes decision was not long in com-
ing and was not confined to the rank and file of the commercial
community. Even members of the judiciary seemed appalled by its
ramifications. One judge commented that Fuentes "indicates a no-
tion that until it was determined had not been held by legal thinkers
anywhere in the United States, that had not been advanced by text
writers [or] by courts of last resort in the various states. It had not
been adopted by various molders . . . of legal opinion. . . ."I Con-
sequently, this particular judge was "not inclined to extend the doc-
trine of Fuentes v. Shevin one millimeter beyond the requirements
of that case .... -29
Another court applied the Fuentes doctrine "with no small mea-
sure of reluctance" and added these comments:
While I applaud any effort to secure for the poor and helpless
the enjoyment of their constitutional rights, it is not clear that
the present trend of judicial thinking will ultimately have this
effect. For those who make an honest effort to maintain their
payment schedules and default due to circumstances beyond
their control, creditors have traditionally exercised considera-
ble flexibility and have exhausted every reasonable alternative
before resorting to the drastic and expensive remedy of repos-
session. These persons, the ostensible beneficiaries of Sniadach
and its progeny, stand to suffer substantially in the long run,
if sellers and creditors raise their prices and interest rates com-
mensurate with the cost of the judicial process which these
decisions make necessary. Further, this court cannot help but
note the increasing segment of our population which has delib-
erately chosen to live on the lower rungs of the economic lad-
der, whether out of revulsion against the materialism of society
or out of lack of ambition and commitment. For these persons,
whether repossession is summary in nature or the result of
judicial process will, in most instances, have little significance.
407 U.S. at 102-03.




Whether or not the benefits of the present decision will prove
sufficient to outweigh the possible costs remains to be seen.,
In open rebellion, the Arizona Supreme Court refused to follow
Fuentes: "Until such time as the United States Supreme Court de-
cides this question by a clear majority [rather than a plurality of 4
to 3], we will continue to uphold the garnishment and attachment
statutes of this state in cases wherein wages are not involved."' 1 The
Louisiana Supreme Court used a less obstrusive technique to avoid
the thrust of Fuentes. It called attention to the fact that Justice
'Stewart had said in Fuentes that there could be "extraordinary situa-
tions" to which the requirements of procedural due process would not
apply and then proceeded to find it was confronted with such an
"extraordinary situation" in both Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Company32
and Buckner v. Carmack.?
Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Company was eventually heard by the
Supreme Court and therefore deserves a closer look. The facts of the
case are remarkably similar to Fuentes. Lawrence Mitchell pur-
chased a refrigerator, stove, stereo and washer from W. T. Grant
3 Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614, 622 (S.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd sub nom, Adams
v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, -
U.S. -, 95 S.Ct. 328 (1974). In Adams v. Egley, the district court held UCC
§ 9-503, which provides for self-help repossession, unconstitutional. The Ninth
Circuit reversed stating that the fact the repossessing creditors acted pursuant to
state law was of itself insufficient to establish state action. The court held that the
test is not state involvement but rather significant state involvement. 492 F.2d at 330-
31, citing Moose Lodge v. Irvas, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S.
369, 380 (1967); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
Some "symbiotic relationship" is required. 492 F.2d at 330-31. The court found the
appellees comparison with Reitman v. Mulkey inapposite. Enactment of the UCC
merely codified existing law; it did not reverse any law as it had been prior to the Code,
especially the creditor's remedy of self-help repossession. Id. at 332. The Ninth Circuit
further stated that the limited state involvement which may be adequate for a finding
of state action in racial discrimination cases does not require a finding of state action
in economic due process cases. Id. at 333. In short, "subjecting all behavior that
conforms to state law to the fourteenth amendment would emasculate the state action
concept." Id. at 331 (footnote omitted). Accord, James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206 (5th
Cir. 1974).
3 Roofing Wholesale Co. v. Palmer, 108 Ariz. 508, 502 P.2d 1327, 1331 (1972). This
decision has been harshly criticized. See Note, Is a 4-3 Decision of the United States
Supreme Court the "Supreme Law of the Land?," 2 FLA. ST. L. REv. 312 (1974). See
also Comment, Four to Three Decisions of the United States Supreme Court Are Not
Binding on the State of Arizona, 1973 LAw & SocIAL OPER 543.
31 263 La. 627, 269 So. 2d 186 (1972).
SLa. _ , 272 So. 2d 326 (1973), appeal dismissed, - U.S. , 94 S.
Ct. 2594 (1974).
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Company pursuant to an installment sales contract. When he de-
faulted on his payments, Grant instituted suit against him in the
First City Court for the Parish of Orleans to recover the unpaid bal-
ance of the purchase price of the merchandise. Grant's complaint
alleged that it had a vendor's lien on the goods and that a writ of
sequestration should issue to sequester the goods pending the out-
come of the suit. The complaint was accompanied by an affidavit of
Grant's store manager swearing to the truth of the facts alleged in the
complaint and asserting that Grant had reason to believe that Law-
rence would "encumber, alienate or otherwise dispose of the mer-
chandise . . .during the pendency of these proceedings, and that a
writ of sequestration is necessary in the premises. '34 This statement
was a standard part of the printed forms used in Louisiana in request-
ing a writ of sequestration and was premised on the fact that under
Louisiana civil law concepts, 35 a debtor in possession of goods subject
to a vendor's lien can pass good title to a third party purchaser. Based
on the complaint and affidavit and without any notice to Mr. Mitch-
ell or opportunity for him to be heard, the judge of the First City
Court for the Parish of Orleans signed an order for issuance of a writ
of sequestration and directed the constable to take possession of the
refrigerator, stove, stereo and washer upon Grant's furnishing bond.
The bond was furnished, at which time the writ of sequestration
issued and the goods were seized. At the same time, Mr. Mitchell was
served with a citation directing him to appear and answer the com-
plaint within five days. Instead, he filed a motion to dissolve the writ
claiming that under Fuentes the summary repossession was unconsti-
tutional. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the procedure was
constitutional because the facts of the case constituted one of those
"extraordinary situations" which Mr. Justice Stewart had mentioned
in the Fuentes opinion."
The Supreme Court granted Mr. Mitchell's writ of certiorari.
37
The Court's action was intriguing because the facts were so similar
to Fuentes. Had the Supreme Court granted certiorari to explicate
the "extraordinary situations" exception to the Fuentes doctrine
which had been mentioned by Mr. Justice Stewart? Or was it just
possible that the Supreme Court intended to use the Mitchell case
as a vehicle for a re-examination of the Fuentes doctrine before a full
1, 269 So. 2d at 187.
1 Louisiana has not adopted the Uniform Commercial Code.
11 269 So. 2d at 190-91.
37 411 U.S. 981 (1973).
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bench including Justices Powell and Rehnquist who had not partici-
pated in Fuentes? I, for one, hoped that it was the latter reason which
had motivated the Supreme Court to grant certiorari.
The Court held in a five to four decision, that the Louisiana se-
questration statute was constitutional.3 Justices Powell and Rehnqu-
ist joined with the three dissenting justices in Fuentes to form a
majority of the Court. Looking only at the end result in the Mitchell
case, one might conclude that Fuentes was overruled. Indeed, Mr.
Justice Powell in a concurring opinion flatly states that this is the
thrust of Mitchell2 But when one examines the opinion of the major-
ity of the Court, written by Mr. Justice White, it hardly seems that
Fuentes was overruled in reaching the end result. The majority opin-
ion carefully avoids any statement to that effect. Indeed, the opinion
meticulously and painstakingly tiptoes through the facts of Mitchell
pointing out distinctions between Mitchell and Fuentes. Mr. Justice
Stewart in his dissenting opinion characterizes these factual distinc-
tions as "insubstantial 4 0 and I would agree. But the fact remains
that the majority of the Court thinks it found distinctions, substan-
tial or not, between Fuentes and Mitchell and thus left Fuentes
standing.
One of the distinctions between Fuentes and Mitchell which the
majority thinks it discerned serves to illustrate the Court's approach.
The majority opinion found that the two cases were different because
in Fuentes the writ of replevin could be signed by the clerk of the
Small Claims Court in Dade County, Florida, whereas in Mitchell,
the writ of sequestration had to be signed by the judge of the First
City Court for the Parish of Orleans." Mr. Justice Stewart's dissent-
ing reply to this purported distinction could be characterized as "so
what." As Mr. Justice Stewart points out, the matter of who signs the
writ is beside the point.42 The important issue revolves around the
common fact in both cases that the writs could be issued ex parte
without notice and hearing. In both cases, the papers used to support
the issuance of the writs were nothing more than standard printed
legal forms on which the blanks had been filled in. "Whether the
issuing functionary be a judge or a court clerk, he can in any event
do no more than ascertain the formal sufficiency of the plaintiff's
allegations, after which the issuance of the summary writ becomes a
416 U.S. 606, 620 (1974).
31 Id. at 623 (Powell, J., concurring).
" Id. at 633 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
, Id. at 616-17.
12 Id. at 632-33 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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simple ministerial act [performed without prior notice and hear-
ing] ."4
This distinction between clerk-issued and judge-issued writs
seems to put writs of sequestration in Louisiana in a peculiar stance.
For some reason wholly unrelated to the fourteenth amendment, the
Parish of Orleans is the only parish in Louisiana where writs of se-
questration are issued by the judge of the First City Court. In all other
parishes, the clerk of the court performs this function. Thus, after
Mitchell, we seem to have an anomalous situation in Louisiana. In
the Parish of Orleans, summary repossession by writs of sequestration
can be accomplished ex parte without notice and hearing but in all
other parishes of Louisiana notice and hearing are required under
Fuentes. If this be the result in Louisiana, it is an Alice in Wonder-
land situation.
As far as the rest of the nation is concerned, Mitchell seems to give
little in the way of guidance. The commercial community continues
to be faced with the dreary, uncertain, expensive and time consuming
process of case by case examination of due process in relation to
summary repossession of collateral. However, one ray of hope was
flashed to the commercial community by the Mitchell case. The end
result in Mitchell, by whatever rationale it was reached, indicates
that the Supreme Court may now be disenchanted with Fuentes.
While the Court is apparently not yet ready to repudiate the Fuentes
doctrine, it has now permitted some erosion of that doctrine. We can
only hope that an outright repudiation of Fuentes except in "extraor-
dinary situations" will come soon in order that the commercial com-
munity will not have to suffer through a creeping process of eroding
Fuentes into obscurity.
Meanwhile, the spectre of Fuentes haunts not only summary re-
possession but also the entire area of self-help repossession of collat-
eral by secured parties. The self-help repossession cases differ from
Fuentes only in the technique used to accomplish summary reposses-
sion. In Fuentes, a public official accomplished the repossession at
the behest of the secured party, while self-help repossession is a "do
it yourself" operation. The secured party repossesses the collateral
without the intercession of courts or public officials. This difference,
however, is not inconsequential.
The fourteenth amendment provides that no state shall "deprive
any person of . . . property without due process of the law . .. ."
Invasions of property rights by private individuals are not within the
11 Id. (footnote omitted).
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purview of the fourteenth amendment. Some significant state in-
volvement is required.4 How, then, can repossession by a private
citizen, the secured party, of property in the possession of another
private citizen, the debtor, involve state action so that the fourteenth
amendment can be invoked? Simplistically stated, the argument
made for state action in the numerous self-help repossession cases
that have already been inspired by Fuentes is that self-help reposses-
sion is authorized by the legislature in § 9-503 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, and hence such repossessions are made under color of
state law and the fourteenth amendment can be invoked.
Most courts which have considered this argument for state action
in the self-help repossession cases have rejected it and have refused
to invoke the fourteenth amendment, thus leaving self-help reposses-
sion of collateral free of due process requirements. 5 A few courts,
however, have found that there was state action involved in the self-
help repossession situation and have gone on to apply the Fuentes
doctrine to the self-help repossession remedy.46
As you can see, these developments place the summary remedy
of self-help repossession in an uncertain and unsatisfactory posture.
In those jurisdictions where the courts have found state action, sum-
mary repossession is subject to due process requirements whether the
1 Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 330-31 (9th Cir. 1974),
citing, Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S.
369, 380 (1967); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
5 See, e.g., Turner v. Impala Motors, 503 F.2d 607, (6th Cir. 1974); Shirley v.
State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1974); Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l
Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,__ U.S. -, 95 S. Ct. 328 (1974);
Bichel Optical Laboratories, Inc. v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 487 F.2d 906 (8th Cir.
1973); Mayhugh v. Bill Allen Chevrolet, 371 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Mo. 1973), aff'd sub
nom., Nowlin v. Professional Auto Sales, Inc., 496 F.2d 16 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
- U.S. - , 95 S. Ct. 328 (1974); Kinch v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 367 F. Supp.
436 (E.D. Tenn. 1973); Shelton v. General Electric Credit Corp., 359 F. Supp. 1079
(M.D. Ga. 1973); Pease v. Havelock Nat'l Bank, 351 F. Supp. 118 (D. Neb. 1972);
Kirksey v. Therley, 351 F. Supp. 727 (D. Colo. 1972); Greene v. First Nat'l Exch. Bank,
348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va. 1972); McCormick v. First Nat'l Bank, 322 F. Supp. 604
(S.D. Fla. 1971); Giglio v. Bank of Delaware, 12 UCC REP. SERv. 934 (Del. Ch. 1973);
Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 121 N.J. Super. 1, 295 A.2d 402 (1972); Frost v.
Mohawk Nat'l Bank, 74 Misc. 2d 912, 347 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1973); Brown v. United States
Nat'l Bank, - Ore. -, 508 P.2d 208 (1973); Sandoval v. American Nat'l Bank,
517 P.2d 188 (Wyo. 1973); Plante v. Industrial Nat'l Bank, 12 UCC REP. SERV. 739 (R.I.
Super. Ct. 1973).
48 Watson v. Branch City Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945, (W.D. Mich., 1974); Gibbs
v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 1974);
Boland v. Essex County Bank & Trust Co., 361 F. Supp. 917 (D. Mass. 1973); Michel
v. Rex-Norelco, Inc., 12 UCC REP. SERV. 543 (D. Vt. 1972).
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repossession is accomplished by self-help or by action of public offi-
cials, e.g., by replevin. In those jurisdictions where the courts have
found no state action is involved in the self-help repossession situa-
tion, the anomolous situation exists whereby summary self-help re-
possession is free of the restraints of due process while summary
repossession by replevin, or like procedures, is subject to the Fuentes
doctrine."
How can the Supreme Court restore some semblance of order to
this important area of summary repossession? It could, of course,
review one of the self-help repossession cases.48 But such a case would
present the liminal issue of state action which will be a sticky wicket
for the Court. If the Court were to find state action in the self-help
repossession situation in order to get at the due process problem, it
might find that it has opened the floodgates to a wave of cases in
11 The requirement of sufficient state action to make the fourteenth amendment
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) applicable to self-help repossession is a significant barrier.
It is unlikely that such a finding would be based on Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369
(1967), since the policy considerations underlying racial discrimination would have to
be considerably broadened in order to apply them to UCC § 9-503.
Problems in finding § 9-503 unconstitutional are also presented by the concept of
the freedom of contract. See Note, State Action and the Constitutionality of UCC §
9-503, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 547, 573 (1973).
On the problem of state action and UCC § 9-503 in general, see, e.g., Burke &
Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and Creditors' Rights: An Essay on the
Fourteenth Amendment, 46 So. CAL. L. REv. 1003 (1973), 47 So. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1973);
Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and Beyond: The Creditor Meets the
Constitution, 59 VA. L. REv. 355 (1973); Note, UCC § 9-503-Does Repossession by a
Secured Creditor Pursuant to Contractual Provisions Constitute State Action? 50
DENWER L.J. 261 (1973); Note, Self-Help Repossession: The Constitutional Attack, the
Legislative Response and the Economic Implications, 62 GEo. L.J. 273 (1973); Note,
State Action Considerations and Economic Implications of Holding Self-Help Repos-
sessions Unconstitutional, 1973 L. & Soc. ORDER 707; Note, Self-Help Repossession
Under the Uniform Commercial Code: The Constitutionality of Article 9, Section 503,
4 N. MEX. L. REV. 75 (1973); Note, Secured Transactions-Repossessions by Self-Help
Uncer UCC § 9-503 as a Violation of Due Process of Law, 24 SYRACUSE L. REv. 867
(1973); Note, Self-Help Repossession: Fuentes and Judicial Process, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 540
(1973); Note. State Action and the Constitutionality of UCC § 9-503, 30 WASH. & LEE:
L. REv. 547 (1973). See also Note, Procedural Due Process-Does Attachment of Real
Estate Without Notice and Hearing Constitute Deprivation of a Significant Security
Interest?, 54 B.U. L. REv. 186 (1974); Note, Procedural Due Process-Post-Fuentes
Constitutionality of Garagemen's Liens, 54 B.U. L. REv. 542 (1974); Note, Sniadach,
Overmyer and Fuentes: Problems for the Mechanics' Lien and Protection for Real
Property Developers, 1973 L. & Soc. ORDER 497.
' A petition for certiorari in a self-help repossession case before the Court since
June 1974 has recently been denied. Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d
324 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, - U.S. - , 95 S.Ct. 32 (1974).
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which protection under the fourteenth amendment is claimed in situ-
ations totally unrelated to creditors' summary prejudgment reme-
dies. Consider, for example, the possible impact that such a finding
of state action might have on all of the situations involving multiple
interests in property-bailments, leases, etc.-where self-help ad-
justment of such interests has been traditional over the years. On the
other hand, if the Court were to find no state action, nothing would
be accomplished by the review. The present anomalous status of the
summary repossession remedy would simply be perpetuated. To end
up with a situation in which summary repossession by self-help is
permitted but summary repossession by writ of replevin is not per-
mitted is commercially unreal. Both techniques of repossession have
the same ultimate impact on the debtor. Both are summary in na-
ture. Both or neither should be subject to due process requirements.
It has been said that credibility is the morality of fiction. Verbal
coherence might be said to be the morality of poetry. Certainty is
ideally the morality of the market place. Summary prejudgment
creditors' remedies have had precious little of this lately. I say again,
the Supreme Court and commerical law make strange bedfellows4
1' Three cases decided subsequent to the time this address was given should be of
special interest to the commercial community. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-
Chem, Inc., - U.S. _, 43 U.S.L.W. 4192 (1975), serves to inject even more
confusion into this area of the law. In North Georgia Finishing, a corporation garnished
the bank account of North Georgia Finishing alleging only "reason to apprehend the
loss of said sum or part thereof unless process of Garnishment issues." 43 U.S.L.W.
4193 (footnote omitted). North Georgia Finishing asserted that the statutory garnish-
ment procedure was unconstitutional in that it violated due process. The Georgia
Supreme Court rejected the assertion that the statute was invalid for failure to provide
notice and hearing in connection with the issuance of the writ of garnishment. The
Georgia court found Sniadach inapplicable, stating that it had only carved out an
exception in favor of wage earners to the general legality of garnishment proceedings.
The Supreme Court found that the Georgia court's approach failed to take account of
Fuentes, and that no viable distinction could be made among types of property in
applying the due process requirements of notice and hearing. Consequently, it refused
to distinguish between a situation where consumer protection was involved and a
purely commercial setting in which parties were of essentially equal bargaining power.
Id. at 4194. Furthermore, the court stated that Mitchell was clearly distinguishable.
In Mitchell, the writ was issuable only by a judge, the affidavit of sequestration was
required to be factual rather than merely conclusory and an immediate hearing was
provided. The decision breathed new life into Fuentes, which had appeared to be
threatened by the result in Mitchell.
Mr. Justice Powell's concurring opinion in North Georgia Finishing also found the
Georgia statute inadequate when measured against the statute in Mitchell. In doing
so, he set forth his views on what due process does and does not require in a garnish-
ment proceeding: (1) pregarnishment notice and prior hearing are not constitutionally
mandated and indeed are antithetical to the very purpose of both garnishment and
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attachment; (2) garnishor must provide adequate security; (3) garnishor must estab-
lish the factual basis of the need for a writ of garnishment or attachment before a
neutral officer, not necessarily a judicial officer; (4) opportunity for a prompt post-
garnishment judicial hearing in which the garnishor has the burden of justifying the
need to continue garnishment must be provided; and (5) provision for the garnishee
to free the garnished assets by posting security should also be provided since the assets
may bear no relation to the controversy giving rise to the garnishment. Id. at 4195. Mr.
Justice Powell found that the conclusory affidavit of the garnishor did not establish
an adequate factual basis. Id. He further concluded that an even more compelling
reason for invalidating the Georgia statute was its failure to provide a prompt and
adequate post-garnishment hearing. Id. at 4196.
One case may provide an opportunity for the commercial world to ascertain
whether such writs must in fact be issued by a judicial officer. The court's opinion in
Guzman v. Western State Bank, (U.S. Jan. 22, 1975), 43 U.S.L.W. 2183 (D.N. Dak.,
Sept. 25, 1974), found all of the elements present which Mr. Justice Powell would
require. In Guzman, the court found that the North Dakota attachment statute gave
debtors the same constitutional protections that the Supreme Court found in Mitchell.
The laws in question permitted a sheriff upon a debtor's default, to seize goods bought
under an installment sales contract without notice or prior hearing. Creditors were
required to file a sworn complaint accompanied by a bond and an affidavit setting forth
the specific statutory grounds of attachment. Upon meeting these requirements, a
court clerk then issued a warrant of attachment. After a general discussion of Mitchell,
the district court ruled that the North Dakota statutes were sufficiently similar to
those in Mitchell to survive constitutional scrutiny. The court focused upon three
factors: (1) the attachment remedy was limited to nine specific grounds; (2) the North
Dakota courts required strict compliance with the statutes; and (3) a debtor had the
statutory right immediately to move for a discharge if an attachment was irregularly
issued. In light of these three considerations, the court ruled that the North Dakota
attachment statutes fulfilled the constitutional requirement of establishing probable
cause before a warrant of attachment issued. Though the issuance of a warrant,
whether by a clerk or a judge after a showing of probable cause is a ministerial act,
the court stated that no constitutional deficiency exists if adequate opportunity is
given for an ultimate judicial determination of liability. Accordingly, it held that the
North Dakota procedure gave the same broad constitutional protection to the debtor
as the statute found valid in Mitchell. Should Guzman end up in the Supreme Court,
we may finally have a definitive answer to the question of exactly what is required to
constitute a valid prejudgment garnishment.
Of greatest immediate importance to the commercial world may be the Supreme
Court's denial of certiorari in Nowlin v. Professional Auto Sales, Inc., 496 F.2d 16 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. - , 95 S.Ct. 328 (1974). In Nowlin, both the
District Court for Nebraska and the District Court for the Western District of Missouri
had held U.C.C. § 9-503 constitutional. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, thus concurring
with a large number of decisions in other courts. See note 45 and accompanying text
supra. The denial of certiorari may mean that the Supreme Court is satisfied with the
results of those decisions. On the other hand, perhaps the Court is only "biding its
time" until it finds a better case through which to enter the area.
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